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JURISDICTION OVER THE CORPORATE AGENT: THE
FIDUCIARY SHIELD
THoMAs H. SPONSLER*
In the decades since the Supreme Court decision in International Shoe
Company v. Washington,I the authority of courts to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants served outside the state of the forum has
grown steadily. Legislatures, through the enactment of broadly reaching
long-arm statutes,2 and courts, through the liberal interpretation of those
statutes3 and the expansive application of the due process standards set
* Visiting Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, Professor of Law, Loyola
University, New Orleans.
** The author wishes to thank Mr. James Oberholtzer, a student at the Washington and
Lee School of Law, for his assistance in the preparation of this article and Mr. Philip K. Hills,
Jr. of New York City for providing a copy of the brief of defendant-respondent in Boas &
Associates v. Vernier.
1 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Abandoning much of its former thinking on the subject, the
Supreme Court specified as the due process test for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident an analysis as to whether the defendant has adequate minimum contacts with
the territory of the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316. The Court's exposition of the appro-
priate factors of analysis indicates that the quantity of the relevant contacts need not be great
when the cause of action sued upon arises out of those contacts. In Hansen v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), the Court further refined the doctrine of International Shoe by indicating
that the contacts between the nonresident defendant and the state of the forum must be
voluntary: "[It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant pur-
posefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253. The International Shoe-
Hansen approach has been most recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Shaffer v.
Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
2 Since the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident depends upon both compatibility
with the due process test of International Shoe and authorization by an appropriate long arm
statute, most state legislatures have enacted such statutes with a mind to availing plaintiffs
of the benefits of International Shoe. Such statutes have normally listed categories of activi-
ties which, if demonstrated, permit the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident. See,
e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW (McKinney) art. 3, § 302(a) n.16 (1972); UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND
INTERNATIONAL PROcEDURE Acr § 1.03. A more recent development is the legislative equation
of the long arm statute with the due process test, thereby making only one analysis necessary
and assuring that no untapped reserve of power compatible with due process exists. See, e.g.,
R.I. GEN. LAWs § 9-5-33 (1956).
3 For examples of courts' going to heroic lengths to provide broad applications of long
arm statutes, see Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
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forth in International Shoe have afforded plaintiffs a greater choice of
forums by increasing defendants' amenability to suit in states other than
those of their domicile. While some legislatures and courts have demon-
strated a greater reluctance than others to test the limits of due process,4
the expanding nature of state court' jurisdiction over parties is unmistaka-
ble. It is therefore noteworthy when a doctrine appears which runs contrary
to this current in the law and restricts the jurisdiction of courts over non-
resident defendants. Such a doctrine has developed over the last twelve
years with little notice and with no critical examination.
The question involved is the amenability of a corporate agent to the
personal jurisdiction of a court within a state in regard to which the agent
has conducted some kind of activity considered relevant under the terms
of the forum state's long arm statute. Although such activities may be
sufficient to subject the corporate principal to the court's jurisdiction, the
doctrine considered here provides a different outcome in regard to the
corporate agent himself. As the theory is most frequently explained:
"[J]urisdiction over an individual cannot be predicated upon jurisdiction
over a corporation. That is to say, an individual's transaction of business
within the state solely as an officer of a corporation does not create per-
sonal jurisdiction over that individual."'
The analyses by the courts in the cases in which this "fiduciary shield
' 7
theory has been discussed have been generally deficient in treating alike
greatly divergent fact patterns which the cases have presented and in
failing to differentiate between the issue of substantive liability and the
issue of jurisdiction. In regard to fact patterns, two principal ones have
emerged: the first occurs when a corporate agent commits an act outside
of the forum state which gives rise to the suit and the agent has no contact
with the forum state except his position within a corporation which does
maintain sufficient contacts with the forum state to permit assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the corporation. In such a case the issue is
whether the relationship between the corporation and the forum state is
Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
For examples of courts' providing rather conservative readings of the due process
clause, see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956);
Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968).
1 Under FED. R. Crv. P. 4(e) federal courts may, in accordance with a statute or rule of
court of the state in which the district court is located, obtain jurisdiction over parties not
inhabitants of or found within the state. References to state court jurisidiction would there-
fore normally apply to federal courts as well in absence of a special federal statute authorizing
broader personal jurisdiction.
I Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798, 803-04 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
' The term "fiduciary shield" appears in Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277, 1282
(10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966). While no other court seems to have engaged in a sufficiently
lengthy discussion of the doctrine to require the use of a shorthand name, the term employed
by these two courts is being used here for convenience.
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sufficient or even relevant in determining the jurisdiction over the corpo-
rate agent. The second occurs when the corporate agent actually enters the
state of the forum and conducts activities sufficient to meet the require-
ments of the state long-arm statute but all of the activities are in his
capacity as corporate agent and none are on his own behalf. The courts
have tended to assume that the danger of unfairness in asserting jurisdic-
tion over the corporate officer in the first case is similarly present in the
second.
The distinction between substantive liability and personal jurisdiction
is significant because in many of the cases in which the fiduciary shield
doctrine has figured, plaintiffs have charged defendants with breaches of
contracts signed by the individual defendants on behalf of their corporate
principals. As a matter of substantive law, it is settled that an agent will
not be personally bound by a contract signed by him on behalf of his
principal unless there is clear evidence that the agent intended to be
bound.' Indeed, it has been held that the agent must sign twice in such
cases, once on behalf of the corporation and once in his personal capacity
In cases of tortious acts, however, the result is different. The corporate
agent who acts improperly is liable along with his principal; the liability
of the principal in no way relieves the liability of the agent.1"
The substantive liability of the agent for torts committed by him on
behalf of the corporation was crucial in the earliest case located by this
writer in which the fiduciary shield argument was considered. In Maternity
Trousseau, Inc. v. Maternity Mart,"' the individual defendant challenged
the jurisdiction of the court over her on the grounds that the activities
conducted by her in the forum state of Maryland were not performed in
her individual capacity but were on behalf of the corporation. The court
rejected the argument, holding specifically that the Maryland long-arm
statute included such activity by the individual defendant within its defi-
nition of "doing business or performing work or services" within the state."
1 E.g., Savoy Record Co. v. Cardinal Export Corp. 15 N.Y.2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 206, 254
N.Y.S.2d 521, (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 et seq. (1957).
9 See, e.g., Saltzman Sign Co. v. Beck, 10 N.Y.2d 63, 176 N.E.2d 74, 217 N.Y.S. 2d 55
(1961).
10 E.g., Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728
(W.D.Ky. 1941), aff'd, 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943); CIC Leasing Corp. v. Dade Linen &
Furniture Co., 279 So. 2d 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
343 (1957).
" 196 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1961).
"Id. at 457; MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 78 (1956) (current version at MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103 (1974):
Any nonresident, person, firm, partnership, general or limited, not qualified under
the laws of this State as to doing business herein, who shall do any business or
perform any character of work or service in this State, shall, by the doing of such
business or the performing of such work, or services, be deemed to have appointed
the secretary of state to be the true and lawful attorney or agent of such nonresi-
dent, upon whom process may be served in any action accrued or accruing from the
doing of such business, or the performing of such work, or services, or as an incident
thereto by any such nonresident, or his, its or their agent, servant or employee.
1978]
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The court also noted that in this case, a tort case, the fact that the defen-
dant was acting as an agent "would not relieve her from liability if such
illegal acts on her part are proved.
'1 3
The first case generally cited for the establishment of the fiduciary
shield theory is Boas & Associates v. Vernier. ' In Boas the plaintiff sought
to recover commissions earned "under a written agreement or under a
subsequent oral agreement." 5 The court's opinion provides few facts upon
which to make an independent analysis but does conclude that there was
no showing that the oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant was
negotiated or concluded by defendant within the forum state of New York.
From this the court decided that the cause of action, to the extent that it
was based upon the oral agreement, could not be said to have arisen from
an act of the defendant in the transaction of business within the state in
accordance with the appropriate provision of New York's long-arm stat-
ute. 6 In regard to the written contract which had been concluded prior to
the alleged oral contract, the court pointed out that the terms of the con-
tract did not relate to the plaintiff's cause of action in this case because
the actions charged against defendant were not inconsistent with the terms
of the contract. 7 In this regard the court concluded that the "written
contract is inapplicable to plaintiff's claims, and its negotiation and execu-
tion by defendant in New York proves no basis for personal jurisdiction. '"'
The following sentence of the opinion is probably the source of the
fiduciary shield theory: "The writing, moreover, was executed by defen-
13 196 F. Supp. at 458.
22 App. Div. 2d 561, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 487 (1965).
' 22 App. Div. at 562, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
N.Y.Civ.PRAc. LAW (McKinney) art. 3, § 302(a) (1972).
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor
or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to the cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act within the state causing injury to a person or property
within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising
from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persist-
ent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences
in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or interna-
tional commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
" The written agreement required the defendant to pay the plaintiff a commission based
upon amounts received in the transfer of a minority interest of a company to "a person or
business having a base, branch or affiliate in the United States." Plaintiff's suit sought a
commission for arranging such a transfer between the defendant and two French nationals.
22 App. Div.2d at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
11 22 App. Div.2d at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
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dant solely in his capacity as general manager of the corporation and not
in his individual capacity."19 Since personal jurisdiction is the subject of
the immediately preceding sentence, this statement has apparently been
construed to mean that the action of the agent in signing the contract in
New York as an agent did not make him subject to the New York court's
jurisdiction. However, the court went on in the very next sentence to cite
two cases, Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck,2" and Savoy Record Co. v. Cardinal
Export Co.,21 for the proposition that "[A] person who signs solely as a
corporate officer is not personally obligated on the contract even though
the text of the writing states that the officer is to be liable personally.
'2
Since the Salzman and Savoy cases involve issues of substantive liability
it is clear that the court's language was directed to the issue of the lack of
substantive liability of the defendant on the written contract which he had
signed as an agent only. The court neither considered nor disposed of the
case on the basis that the defendant's actions within the state, otherwise
relevent to the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff, could not be con-
sidered in determining personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the
state's long-arm statute.
Despite this fact the Boas decision has been cited by subsequent courts
as authority for the fiduciary shield theory.n Indeed, the very next year the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited Boas as au-
thority for this propositionu although the majority concluded that the
doctrine did not apply to the facts of that case. A dissenter, however,
concluded that such was clearly the law in New York and that it did apply
to the facts at hand:
[I]t is clear that the activites of Klein as a corporate officer on
behalf of the corporations do not constitute the transaction of busi-
11 Id. In the defendant-respondent's brief the following summary of a portion of the
argument appears: "A corporate officer acting solely in such capacity does not subject his
person to the jurisdiction of New York courts merely by executing a corporate agreement in
New York." Brief for Respondent at 14. This statement appears at the outset of a portion of
the brief in which it is argued that the respondent cannot be bound on a contract executed
on behalf of his principal. The thrust of the entire argument is the absence of substantive
liability. Respondent concluded this portion of his argument as follows: "The corporate
transaction was clearly intended to bind only the disclosed corporate principal and cannot
properly be imputed to the corporate officer to subject the latter to New York jurisdiction
under section 302(a)(1) C.P.L.R." Brief for Respondent at 18. To the extent that the respon-
dent argued and the court accepted the argument that the agent could not be subjected to
the jurisdiction of the New York courts because of his status as an agent, such a conclusion
was based upon the fact that he was not liable as a matter of substantive law.
10 N.Y.2d 63, 176 N.E.2d 74, 217 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1961).
21 15 N.Y.2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 206, 254 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1964).
n 22 App.Div.2d at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
1 Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 n.8 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 1966); Alosio v. Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A.,
307 F.Supp. 1117, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Schenin v. Micro Copper Corp., 272 F. Supp. 523,
528 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2, United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 1966).
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ness by Klein individually. 235 F. Supp. 345, 348. This holding by
the district court is squarely in accord with well settled New York
law, including a recent decision that jurisdiction under C.P.L.K.
Sec. 302(a)(1) may not be obtained over an individual who acts in
New York "solely in his capacity as general manager of the corpo-
ration, and not in his individual capacity." Boas & Associates v.
Vernier, 22 A.D.2d 1, 561, 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (1st Dept.
1965). See Savoy Record Co. v. Cardinal Export Corp., 15 N.Y.2d
1, 254 N.Y.S.2d 521, 203 N.E.2d 206 (1964); Salzman Sign Co.
v. Beck, 10 N.Y.2d 63, 217 N.Y.S.2d 55, 176 N.E.2d 74 (1961);
Mencher v. Weiss, 306 N.Y. 1, 4, 114 N.E.2d 177, 179 (1953); Hall
v. Lauderdale, 46 N.Y. 70, 74 (1871).12
The dissenter's cited cases all relate to the substantive liability of an agent
who signs the contract on behalf of his principal. None of them, including
Boas, concern the proposition for which they were cited.
Another early case cited as supporting the fiduciary shield theory is
Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Company.26 In that case the plain-
tiff brought suit against various individual corporate officers of the defen-
dant corporation charging them with conspiracy to precipitate a termina-
tion of a contract between plaintiff and the corporate defendant, thereby
wrongfully interfering with the contractual relationship. Plaintiff alleged
that the individual defendants, in furtherance of this conspiracy, ap-
pointed coordinators and administrators 7 to enter the state of New York
to impede and hinder plaintiff in the performance of its agreement with
defendant and thus bring about the eventual breach of contract. Plaintiff
asserted that the coordinators and administrators were actually the agents
of the individual defendants and not merely agents of the corporation. The
court mentioned no visits by the individual defendants to New York in
regard to the facts giving rise to the cause of action.
The disputed facts upon which the jurisdictional issues turned were the
same as those which determined the substantive issues in the case; if the
corporate employees who did enter the state were personal agents of the
individual defendant, plaintiff had a cause of action against the individual
defendants and personal jurisdiction over them since they had acted in the
state through agents. 8 If the corporate employees who entered New York
were not acting for the individual defendants but for the corporation only,
there would be no substantive claim against the individual defendants and
no jurisdiction over them since they had not personally entered the state
or acted therein by or through agents. The issue of the agency of the
11 Id. at 252.
28 250 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
" The "coordinators" and "administrators" were allegedly sent into New York to inter-
fere with the plaintiff's management of a third corporation and to prevent plaintiff from
exercising rights under its agreement with the defendant corporation. Id. at 851.
1 See N.Y.CIv.PRAc.LAw (McKinney) art. 3, § 302(a) (1972) (permits the assertion of
jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who acts in person or through an agent).
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coordinators and administrators was thus the crucial factual issue upon
which both the jurisdictional issue and the substantive issue turned. The
court examined the affidavits submitted on the issue and concluded that
the plaintiffs had offered:
absolutely no indication of the factual support for jurisdictional
allegations (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the individual
defendants were acting in furtherance of their own interests rather
than what they conceived, in good faith, to be Koppers' interest,
or (3) that the employees sent to New York in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy were acting as the agents of the individual de-
fendants rather than of Koppers. 9
The court did not conclude that the corporate employees performing the
acts which would meet the terms of the long-arm statute would not be
subject to the court's jurisdiction, but that the coordinators and adminis-
trators sent into New York, the only contact between New York and the
individual defendants, had not been demonstrated to be the actual agents
of the individual defendants. The court held that the affidavits had pre-
sented insufficient indication of such an agency relationship to merit a
hearing on the issue."
The plaintiff in Unicon attempted to transform a breach of contract
suit against a corporation into a tort suit against the corporation's officers
whose actions in management of the corporation led to the alleged breach.
The court appeared willing to embrace such a theory if the plaintiff could
offer some evidence to substantiate the allegation that the coordinators
and administrators sent into New York acted on behalf of the individual
defendants personally. The absence of such a showing resulted in dismissal
of the suit. Unicon, like Boas, involved no fiduciary shield theory.
The third case bringing the fiduciary shield theory to existence was
Schenin v. Micro Copper Corp.,"' a case presenting almost the same facts
as Unicon. As in Unicon the plaintiff essentially had a breach of contract
claim which he tried to transform into a tort suit against the officers of the
contracting corporation. The court was presented with several alternate
theories" of jurisdiction one of which was that the individual defendants
had transacted business in the state of New York, thereby coming within
the scope of the long-arm statute. The parties and the court misread Boas
and Unicon2 to provide for a fiduciary shield doctrine and went on to
inquire whether the defendant was present in the state to transact business
on his own behalf as well as on behalf of the corporation. The argument
250 F. Supp. at 852.
:o Id. at 853.
3' 272 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y.1967).
12 "Plaintiff concedes that, if Swift and Cook had entered New York solely for the pur-
pose of transacting business on behalf of Vanura, the Court would lack jurisdiction over their
persons. Boas & Associates v. Vernier, 22 A.D.2d 561, 257 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1st Dep't 1965);
Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 250 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y.1966)." Id. at 528.
1978]
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employed by plaintiff was that the defendants had bound themselves per-
sonally when signing the contract on behalf of the corporation; the court
concluded that the appropriate high standard for binding the agent to the
contract of the principal had not been met. Notably, in another part of the
opinion, discussing the assertion that the defendants had committed tor-
tious acts within New York, the court concluded that any such acts had
occurred outside of the state.3 Although this would have been a logical
point at which to discuss specifically the fiduciary shield theory the court
made no mention of it.
In each of these first three cases generally cited for the fiduciary shield
theory, the courts were not compelled by the facts to apply such doctrine.
The court in Boas apparently neither intended nor did in fact announce
such a doctrine; the court in Schenin, although it assumed the existence
of such a doctrine, was, like the Unicon court, really concerned with sub-
stantive law, dealing as it did with the liability of a corporate officer under
a contract signed on behalf of the corporation. Nevertheless, the language
employed by the courts in the latter two cases superficially indicates a
recognition of a fiduciary shield theory.
It was not until the fourth case, Willner v. Thompson,34 that a fiduciary
shield theory may have had actual effect. Wiflner was a contract action in
a New York court against a California corporation and an individual defen-
dant. It is not clear from the court's recitation of the facts whether the
individual defendant was joined because he was actually a party to the
contract on merely as the signator for the corporation. The court concluded
that the corporation was subject to the New York long-arm statute but that
the individual defendant was not. Here the plaintiff admitted that the
individual defendant conducted no business in New York in his own right.
The court concluded without explanation that he could not be served in
California under the terms of the New York long-arm statute since he had
not transacted any business in New York. 5 The court offered no explana-
tion of what activities, if any, the individual defendant engaged in within
New York nor any citation of authority for its conclusion. It is impossible
therefore to know if the ficuciary shield theory was actually applied. The
court's language was sufficiently broad, however, to convince subsequent
courts that such a theory was applied. 8
Id. at 529.
285 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
Id. at 397. See N.Y.Civ.PRAc.LAw (McKinney) art. 3, § 302(a) (1972).
285 F. Supp. at 397. The Willner court stated:
A different question is presented concerning the individual defendant. Plaintiffs
admit that this defendant conducted no business in New York in his own right and
they made no showing that the activities of the corporation may be attributed to
him as the corporation's alter ago. Plaintiffs do not allege that the corporate entity
is a mere facade or sham to protect the individual defendant. Since the corporate
defendant is not the agent of the individual defendant, its acts cannot possibly be
attributed to him. It follows that the individual defendant did not transact any
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The fiduciary shield theory, heretofore strictly a creature of New York
courts, gained added legitimacy in Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe,37 a decision
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Wilshire was a tort suit by a
corporation against former officers whose actions made the corporation
liable, criminally and civilly, for antitrust violations. The activities of the
individual defendants were performed in various capacities as officers of
the plaintiff corporation and of other corporations which the individual
defendants themselves controlled. The opinion at times invites the conclu-
sion that the activities of the defendants within the foreign state, Kansas,
were insufficiently related to the cause of action asserted against them to
invoke the Kansas long-arm statute, and at times supports the fiduciary
shield theory. It is clear that the district court' and the court of appeals
recognized the efficacy of the fiduciary shield doctrine although the court
of appeals did not totally rely upon this as a basis for its decision. 9
The court of appeals in Wilshire treated the fiduciary shield theory
tentatively, indicating by way of footnote that "it has been held that" such
was the case." By 1970, the court in Path Instruments International Corp.
v. Ashi Optical Co.4" held that it was "settled" that the corporate shield
business in New York and could not be validly served in California pursuant to
Section 302, CPLR.
Id. at 397.
Despite the ambiguity of this language, courts in Whilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277
(10th Cir. 1969), and Path Instruments Int'l Corp. v. Asahi Optical Co., 312 F. Supp. 805
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), have cited Wiflner while holding that they lacked jurisdiction over corpo-
rate officers who actually entered the forum state to perform activities connected with the
cause of action.
7 409 F. 2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
" The foregoing activities were, for the most part, conducted by Homer Rifle
and L.E. Rifle in their capacity as agents and employees of Wilshire. This led the
district court to conclude that these agents, in performing these acts for their
corporate principal, did not thereby render themselves personally amenable to
service of process under the Kansas statute, i.e., they were not individually trans-
acting business in Kansas in the sense specified in the statute.
Id. at 1280-81.
31 Thus, our previous discussion of the fiduciary shield precluding an exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a corporate agent applies with equal force here. None-
theless we do not deem it necessary to decide the matter solely on that basis. The
interaction of the inherent weakness of the contacts and the strained causal connec-
tion with the underlying cause of action, operate in conjunction with the fact of the
agency relationship to require, in conformity with notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice, that this court refrain from compelling a corporate officer to answer in
courts located in a state foreign to both the agent and his corporation.
Id: at 1282-83.
11 It has been held that while a foreign corporation is amenable to service when
it transacts business through agents operating in the forum state, unless the agents
transact business on their own account and not on behalf of the corporation, the
agents are not engaged in business so as to sustain an application of the long-arm
statute to them as individuals.
Id. at 1281 n.8.
" 312 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). "It is settled that jurisdiction over individual
1978]
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theory was applicable. Path, like Wilshire, was a tort case but this time
the court conceded that the individual defendants had entered the forum
state, New York, for business purposes connected with the subject matter
of the action. Yet, citing Wilshire, Schenin, Unicon and Willner, the court
found no personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. By 1975
in Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc. v. Birenbaum,42 "settled" gave way to
"axiomatic" and the fiduciary shield theory had become an accepted juris-
dictional doctrine without a single full dress analysis by court or commen-
tator."
The most extensive analysis of the doctrine to date appears in Idaho
Potato Commission v. Washington Potato Commission.4 In that case suit
was brought by an Idaho state agency against a Washington state agency
and its individual directors for approving an advertising plan which was
disseminated in Idaho and which allegedly infringed the plaintiffs trade-
mark. The members of the Washington Commission were never shown to
be present in Idaho. In considering the jurisdictional issue, the court dis-
cussed the instance of a truck driver who enters a state and commits a
tortious act; it reasoned that both he and his employer would be subject
to the personal jurisdiction of the state's courts." In the case under consid-
eration, although the defendant commission, like the more common corpo-
rate defendant, had sufficient contacts with the state to permit assertion
of personal jurisdiction over it for actions taken outside the state, the court
was unwilling to assert personal jurisdiction over the commission members
who acted in their official capacities but outside of the state. The court
emphasized the fact that the commission members would have no reasona-
ble expectation of being sued in another state for their official activities."
While the court's discussion of the truck driver points to a different conclu-
sion had the commission members entered the state of Idaho there is other
language in the opinion that points to the opposite result. 7 Other courts
officers and employees of a corporation may not be predicated merely upon jurisdiction over
the corporation itself." Id. at 810.
11 389 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975). "It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over an individual cannot be predicated upon jurisdiction over a corporation.
That is to say, an individual's transaction of business within the state solely as an officer of
a corporation does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual." Id. at 803-04.
,1 The subject is briefly treated in C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL § 1069 (Supp. 1976), but no analysis is offered.
" 410 F. Supp. 171 (D. Idaho 1976).
I Id. at 182. Cf. Eisman v. Martin, 174 Kan. 726, 258 P.2d 296 (1953) (state implied
consent statute held to apply to the agent driver of an automobile as well as to the owner).
16 410 F. Supp. at 182.
The members of any such commission, including employees of such board, shall not
be held responsible individually in any way whatsoever to any person for errors in
judgment, mistakes, or other acts, either of commission or omission, as principal,
agent, person or employee, except for their own individual acts of dishonesty or
crime.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 15.66.230 (West 1971), cited at 410 F. Supp. at 182, n.4.
" The same substantive distinction applies in cases where tortious activity is
alleged to confer personal jurisdiction under a state's long arm statute, such that
[Vol. XXXV
JURISDICTION OVER CORPORATE AGENT
have applied the doctrine to corporate officers who have in fact entered the
forum states and committed tortious acts there with no consideration
being given to the inconsistency between such a result and that which
would apply in a case such as that of the hypothetical truck driver. 8
The parameters of the fiduciary shield doctrine in the jurisdictions in
which it has been accepted include possible exceptions. Courts otherwise
willing to recognize and apply the theory have expressed a willingness to
disregard the corporate form and reach the corporate officer, usually on the
theory that the individual defendant is the alter ego of the corporation.
Thus, if the corporation is owned and controlled entirely by the individual
defendant,"9 if the individual's actions partake of fraud or are otherwise
criminal," or if they serve his personal interests as distinct from those of
unless there is evidence that the act by the corporate officer was other than as an
agent for the corporation, then personal jurisdiction over the corporate officer will
not lie. Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
410 F. Supp. at 181.
The situation here is much like activity by a corporate employee who, by perform-
ing corporate business, causes the corporation to purposefully avail itself of the law
of another state. Absent a ruse to conceal an employee's personal activity behind
the corporate shield, it is most difficult to conclude that the employee purposefully
availed himself of a distant forum's laws.
410 F. Supp. at 183. Despite the court's apparent willingness to decline jurisdiction even over
a corporate officer who enters the state to transact business on behalf of his principal, the
court did distinguish the facts at hand from its hypothetical involving a truck driver by noting
that the individual defendants were never physically present in Idaho but acted only in
Washington with the effect being felt in Idaho. This distinction followed the court's observa-
tion that "conceptually, it is difficult to distinguish the facts in this case from" the hypotheti-
cal situation involving the truck driver. 410 F. Supp. at 182.
I The imprecision with which the relevant facts are explained hinders analysis in most
cases, but several courts, although willing to concede that the individual defendants did enter
the state in regard to the subject matter of the lawsuit, still declined to exercise jurisdiction
over them: Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969) (individual defendant
entered the forum state and allegedly made misrepresentations in the course of contract
negotiations on behalf of the principal); Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc. v. Birenbarum, 389 F.
Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (individual defendant made visits to the forum state which may
have been unrelated to the cause of action); Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F.
Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (court indicates that individual defendants may have transacted
business within the forum state, but if so, only as agents of the corporation); Path Instru-
ments Int'l Corp. v. Asahi Optical Co., 312 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (court concedes that
all of the individual defendants have entered the state of the forum for business purposes);
Yardis Corp. v. Cirami, 76 Misc.2d 793, 351 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (court refuses
to enforce a default judgment rendered in another state on the ground that anything done in
the other state by the individual defendant was done as an officer and employee of a foreign
corporation).
11 Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1974). In this case the court upheld the
assertion of jurisdiction under the terms of the Alabama long-arm statute over a corporate
officer who acted in Alabama on behalf of the corporation of which he was president, chaiman
of the board, de facto sole stockholder and which he dominated completely. The court made
no mention of the fiduciary shield line of cases.
w United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966). The court upheld
jurisdiction over the estate of a corporate officer whose acts amounted to a breach of fiduciary
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the corporation,"' the court may be willing to disregard the fiduciary shield.
In a few cases the courts have gone further and asserted jurisdiction
over a corporate officer while admitting that the individual defendant did
not have sufficient contacts with the state of the forum apart from contacts
through the corporation. These courts come to a result directly opposed to
the fiduciary shield theory; attributing to the individual the contacts
which exist between the corporate employer and the state. The opinion in
the leading such case, Odell v. Singer,5" provides the clearest explanation
for such a result.
This presents a rather unique situation. The corporation has per-
formed sufficient acts to constitute it as doing business, but the
individuals through whom the corporation must act have not per-
formed sufficient acts to constitute them as doing business. May
the corporate acts be imputed to the individuals for the purpose
of obtaining jurisdiction over them? In this instance we think so
. . . . Further, in this case, the acts of the corporation are chargea-
ble to the individuals for purposes of determining the existence of
jurisdiction. The reason being that the individual officers, as
agents of the corporation would be personally liable to any third
person they injured by virtue of their tortious activity even if such
acts were performed within the scope of their employment as cor-
porate officers. On this basis, appellees could not escape liability
because of their non-residence, when the corporation which they
represent was doing business in the state. If the tortious corporate
activity is attributable to them personally, then the acts of that
corporation which constitute it as doing business in this state are
similarly attributable to the individuals for purposes of determin-
ing jurisdiction.
5 3
obligation to the corporation and a wrongful diversion of funds to himself from the corpora-
tion. Plaintiff was successful in alleging that the corporate agents acting within the forum
state were personal agents of the absent defendant, the argument unsuccessfully asserted in
Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974); Alosio v. Iranian Shipping Lines,
S.A., 307 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Unicon Mgt. Corp. v. Koppers Co., 250 F. Supp.
850 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court upheld assertion of jurisdiction over individual defendants
who used an underfinanced corporation to defraud those they dealt with and used illegal bank
accounts to siphon money out of the corporation for personal use. This case is also notable
for the dissatisfaction expressed by the court with the fiduciary shield theory: "However
debatable it may be in the light of reasons underlying the minimum contacts theory. . . to
differentiate between a corporate act and an individual act, this remains a distinction of legal
significance." Id. at 1118.
"1 Krause v. Hauser, 272 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (court asserts jurisdiction over a
partner acting in New York since he was acting in violation of his fiduciary duties by impro-
perly furthering his own interests). See also United States v. Montreal Trust Co. 358 F.2d
239 (2d Cir. 1966).
512 169 So.2d 851 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1964), writ discharged, 176 So.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. Fla.
1965).
11 Id. at 853-54.
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Several other courts have adoped similar reasoning, usually on the
grounds that the corporate form was not adequately maintained, 4 that the
individual owners of the corporation were using the corporation as their
agent for the transaction of business in the forum state,5 or that the inter-
ests of the individual defendant and the corporation were identical. 6 Fi-
nally, a few courts, while not going so far as to attribute to a nonresident
individual the jurisdiction producing contacts of a corporation, have dec-
lined to adopt the fiduciary shield doctrine to the extent that it would
immunize the corporate agent for actions taken by him in the forum state.57
This development of the fiduciary shield doctrine in those jurisdictions
that have accepted it appears to be based on the failure of courts to distin-
guish disparate factual situations and upon unthinking reliance upon prior
cases and language which were not relevant to the situations before them.
Starting with the early New York cases" which turned on matters of sub-
Country Maid, Inc. v. Haseotes, 299 F. Supp. 633, 637 (E.D.Pa. 1969). This was suit
against thirteen sibling corporations with identical owners, directors and executive boards.
The court concluded that the individual corporations together constituted but one business
operation. Id. at 638.
11 Fisher v. Premiere Realty Co., 298 So.2d 447, 449 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1974). (three
sole nonresident shareholders of a corporation held subject to the court's jurisdiction after
they personally guaranteed a lease entered into by the corporation); Harris v. Arlen Proper-
ties, Inc., 256 Md. 185, 198-200, 260 A.2d 22, 29-30 (Ct. App. Md. 1969) (jurisdiction over a
parent corporation found through the activities of the subsidiary whose sole purpose was to
hold title to real estate for the parent).
" In Holfield v. Power Chemical Co., 382 F. Supp., 388 (D. Md. 1974), the court upheld
jurisdiction over the president-owner of a corporation stating:
Where, as in this case, there is an unmistakable identity of interest between the
defendant and the corporation through which he acts, where that corporation has
acted in a manner that brings it within a long-arm statute, and where significant
forum state interests are involved in the cause of action, then disregarding the
corporation entity to reach the defendant for the purpose of asserting the personal
jurisdiction of the state courts over the defendant does not offend the due process
requirements of the Constitution.
Id. at 394. In Lawson v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 373 (D. Md. 1969),
the court, emphasizing the difficulty plaintiff would have in obtaining jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendants in any other single forum, asserted jurisdiction over them stating:
The allegations of the amended complaint go beyond the mere fact that the individ-
ual defendants acted as directors or officers of a corporation incorporated in Mary-
land or a corporation having its principal place of business in Maryland. In this case
the corporation was incorporated in Maryland and has its principal office and place
of business in Maryland, and each of the individual defendants has derived sub-
stantial revenue from his services as a director or officer or both, which services we
have seen, were used in Maryland within the meaning of section 96(a)(4). It is
further alleged that defendants' acts caused tortious injury to [the] [c]orporation
in Maryland.
Id. at 379.
5 Costin v. Olen, 449 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971); Topik v. Catalyst Research Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 1102 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 907 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973);
Maternity Trousseau Inc. v. Maternity Mart, 196 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1961); Simmons v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 295 So.2d 550 (Ct. App. La.), writ denied, result found to be correct, 299
So.2d 795 (1974).
1 See notes 14-34 supra.
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stantive law or in which the facts would not allow assertion of jurisdiction
even without resort to a theory of corporate insulation of employees, the
language employed took on a life of its own apart from the contexts in
which it was used. This disturbing process established, a theory which
closer analysis and application of existing doctrine refutes.
Initially a distinction must be drawn between the situation in which a
corporate employee enters the jurisdiction and one in which he does not.
If the employee has no direct contacts with the state of the forum it may
be unreasonable, given only his relationship to the corporation that may
have such contacts, to conclude that he would be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court. To the extent that the statement "jurisdiction
over an individual cannot be predicated upon jurisdiction over a corpora-
tion"59 carries this meaning, it is appropriate. A contrary conclusion would
make every officer, employee, or director of a corporation subject to the
personal jurisdiction of courts in every state where the corporation is doing
business, certainly a result unfair to the individual employee.
Such would certainly be true in the case of a large corporation whose
operations cross state lines; an employee of such a corporation is in no
sense the alter ego of the corporatoon. Most corporations are far more
modest, however, and the corporate structure may be a vehicle for the
conduct of business by an individual or a set of individuals whose control
over the corporation and its day to day operations is total. In such cases
the actions taken by individual defendants outside the state of the forum
for which the substantive law would impose liability and which, through
the vehicle of the corporation, have produced adverse effects within the
state of the forum, should reasonably subject the absent individuals to
personal jurisdiction in the forum state providing control of the corporate
activities can be fairly attributed to them.
While comparatively few cases exist in which such an analysis has
resulted in the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individ-
ual, the problem arises fairly frequently in the context of parent corpora-
tions being reached through the activities of their wholly owned and con-
trolled subsidiaries in the forum state. A rich store of precedent exists for
analysis in such cases,"0 with two major approaches evident. One line of
cases emphasizes the care with which the corporate identities of the parent
and subsidiary are maintained.6 ' These cases emphasize the following fac-
Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" See, e.g. Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Flank Oil Co.
v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357 (D. Col. 1967); Mathes v. P.T. Nat'l Util. Helicop-
ters, Ltd., 68 Cal. App. 3d 182, 137 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1977); Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry Corp.,
288 So.2d 404 (Ct. App. La.), writ denied, result found to be correct, 290 So.2d 911 (1974);
Public Adm'r of New York, Co. v. Royal Bank, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d
378 (1967).
1' See, e.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); Berkman v.
Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F. 2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957); Smeltzer v. Deere Co., 252 F. Supp. 552
(W. D. Pa. 1966); Fisher Baking Co. v. Continental Baking Corp. 238 F. Supp. 322 (D. Utah
1965).
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tors: are separate records kept for each firm including records of transac-
tions between them?; are there separate by-laws, charters and accounts?;
are there separate boards of directors and do they meet separately?; a
second line of cases disregards the formal separation of the two corpora-
tions and concentrates on the day to day control of the subsidiary by the
parent.2 These cases focus on the following questions: did the parent cre-
ate the subsidiary as an investment or does the parent in fact do business
through the subsidiary by controlling its every activity?; do the officers of
the two corporations act separately?; who chooses the officers of the
subsidiary?; and, perhaps most crucially, who controls the actions of the
subsidiary in regard to the activity giving rise to the lawsuit?
Comparable considerations should be relevant in ascribing the jurisdic-
tion producing contacts of the corporation to the defendant individuals. If
the individual defendant's interests are identical to those of the corpora-
tion, and he alone with others controls the day to day activities of the
corporation including the activities giving rise to the suit and the existence
of the corporate form does not immunize him from substantive liability,
it would violate no notion of fundamental fairness to conclude that the
individual was conducting business in the forum state through the corpora-
tion. In the few cases in which courts have reached the individual defen-
dants through the corporation such factors have been present and consid-
ered relevant. 3 Such cases remain isolated and no significant body of
precedent has yet evolved to refute the more frequently voiced and broader
conclusion that the individual cannot be reached through the corporation.
When the individual defendant actually enters the territory of the
forum state for purposes relevant to the suit or engages in other activities
which would subject him to the terms of the forum's long-arm statute
without attributing to him contacts of the corporation, the application of
the fiduciary shield theory is less defensible. Although the early cases did
not involve the actual presence of the corporate agent in the forum state;
it was the broad language of these cases which later courts took to have
stated the "settled" law. Thus, with little or no analysis of their own, these
later courts declined to exercise jurisdiction over corporate agents who
actually entered the forum's territory."
One possible line of reasoning could sustain such a result. A corporate
agent who enters a state to act on behalf of his principal may not be "doing
business" in the state as that term is used in a particular long-arm stat-
ute. 5 "Doing business" has traditionally carried with it a connotation of
12 See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N. D. Tex. 1973); Handlos v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
304 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
'3 See notes 54-56 supra.
" See note 48 supra.
Many of the cases predating International Shoe were concerned with the question of
whether the defendant corporation was "doing business" within the forum state. The tests
for "doing business" became incredibly complex and confused. For a good discussion of the
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more persistent activity than "transacts business".6 However, most long-
arm statutes, including that of New York 7 where the doctrine is most
frequently applied, employ the term "transacts business", and the pres-
ence of a corporate agent who negotiates, makes repesentations or other-
wise enters into business transactions on behalf of his corporate principal
fits the normal understanding of that term. No case so far has made this
distinction; the existing decisions, usually reached in regard to statutes
employing the "transacts business" wording, are based on the conclusion
that the corporate agent who transacts business on behalf of his corporate
employer is not transacting business as the statute employs the term and
is consequently not subject to service. Such a conclusion is at odds with
the kind of analysis that has been applied since International Shoe. That
analysis has emphasized the logical relationship between the nonresident
defendant, the cause of action sued upon, and the state of the forum. If
the cause of action sued upon arises from some activity purposefully con-
ducted in the forum state by the nonresident defendant, jurisdiction is
consistent with due process even though the defendant's relationship to the
state of the forum may be limited to the very contacts giving rise to the
lawsuit.6 8 If the defendant has entered the forum state and there transacted
business, it is not unfair to make him answer for his actions in the same
state. When a corporate agent enters the forum state, even under orders
from the corporation, he is acting in his own interest by carrying out the
responsibilities of his employment. Despite the fact that he may have
acted under orders, his presence in the forum state still amounts to his
entry into the state's legitimate sphere of concern.
Making the corporate agent amenable to the court's jurisdiction would
seldom involve any hardship to the agent greater than that implicit in
being sued in any state. Any corporate agent whose actions raise a legiti-
mate question of substantive liability will certainly be sufficiently involved
in the facts of the dispute to require his presence as a witness at any trial
involving his corporate employer. Failure to assert jurisdiction over him
would merely result in his presence as a witness and not as a party. When
the corporation is financially strong enough to be responsible for any ad-
verse judgment obtained by plaintiff it will normally assume the liability
doctrine prior to International Shoe, see Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958).
,6 The UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACr, § 1.03(4) provides for
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in regard to a cause of action arising from
his "causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct." This concept
of doing business is in accord with the usual notion of doing business as extending beyond
isolated transactions.
*7 See note 16 supra.
" McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221-22 (1957). In McGee, jurisdic-
tion was permitted over a Texas insurer in California despite the fact that the policy sued
upon was apparently the only policy issued by the defendant in California and the defendant
had not solicited or done business in the state. Id. at 222.
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of the employee or at least provide for his defense, usually as part of the
corporation's own defense.69 If the corporate defendant is less able than its
agent to sustain an adverse judgment, it is more likely that the corporation
may be a shell to protect the activities of the agent. In such a case the need
to obtain jurisdiction over the individual agent is even greater for plaintiff.
The corporate officer/agent like the employee truck driver should have
his activities examined separately from that of the corporation. The con-
clusion that the court has jurisdiction over the corporation should not
mean that it has jurisdiction over the individual defendant; however, the
fact that the individual defendant's actions otherwise meet the terms of
the long-arm statute should not be affected by the fact that he has acted
in a corporate capacity.
Applying such an analysis to the cases which have involved the fidu-
ciary shield doctrine results in few changes. In those cases in which the
individual defendants did not enter the state of the forum or where their
contacts with the state were otherwise insubstantial, no jurisdiction would
result. However, in cases like Path Instruments" and Wilshire Oil"' where
the defendants did enter the forum or otherwise met the terms of the long-
arm statute, jurisdiction over the individual defendants would obtain.
Ignoring any notion that acting in a corporate capacity somehow pro-
vides the defendant with a jurisdictional shield eliminates unfairness to
the plaintiff and permits a systematic application of jurisdictional princi-
ples as they are applied in other contexts .7 The doctrine of the fiduciary
shield, having come into existence through misunderstanding and having
thrived on lack of articulation and analysis, should be allowed to fade away
in the course of more reasoned application of established principles.
11 See generally M. SHAEFFLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICERS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSUR-
ANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DmECTORS (1976).
o See note 41 supra.
7 See note 37 supra.
71 The application of differing analyses depending upon the substantive issues involved
in particular suits is not unknown although it is not often discussed thoroughly. For an
interesting treatment of some of the issues see Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests
and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 227 (1967).
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